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fL. A. No. 24322. [n Bank. Nov. 19.1957.1 
GERTRUDE LEWIS, Appellant, v. ULYSSES LEWIS, 
Respondent. 
[1] Divorce-Foreign Divorce-Collateral Attac'.k.-A wife who 
secured a Judgment of separatt' maintenanc~ m Illinois (th ... 
state of her domIcile) after th... rendition of a valid divorct" 
decree for the husband in Nevada was not precluded from 
enforcing bel' nght to iI1lpport in CalifOrnIa. the state of tbf 
husband's present dom1cile. where the husband did not iDvob 
the Nevada divorcl' dec.rel' in the min01!' proceeding: even if 
sucb decree had been pleaded as a defense m that proceedi~ 
and the llliDois court had erroneously failed to recogmze 1t 
the husband's remedy was by appeal and he cannot attack tb ... 
Dlinois judgment· in a subseqnent pl'oceedi~ in California to 
enforce th ... wiffl's riJrht to support. . 
[I} See Oal.Jur.2c1,. I)jvorce and Separation. § 31th Am.Jur .. 
Divorce and Separation. § 742 et seq. 
MeB.. Dig. References: (1) Divorce, § 307; [2, S, 6,1 Divorce, 
1$ 304; [4) Divorce, § 306.1; [5) Divorce, § 305. 
) 
390 LEWIS v. LEWIS [49 C.2d 
[2J Id.-Foreign Divorce-Full Faith and Credit.-A Nevada di 
vorce court baving no personal ,jurisdiction over tbe wife has 
no power to terminate a husband's obligation to provide her 
support as required by Illinois law, and neither the Illinois 
court nor the Supreme Court of California, the state of the 
husband's present domicile, is obliged to recognize that part 
of a Nevada divorce decree for the husband purporting to 
terminate the wife's right to support in Illinois, where the 
wife has maintained her domicile. (Disapproving· Ohirg1D'n v. 
Ohirg1Din, 26 Cal.App.2d 506, 79 P.2d 772.), 
[3] Id.-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Wife's Bight to Support.-
The effect on a wife's right to support of a foreign ell: parte 
divorce secured by the husband is determined by reference to 
the law of the state of the wife's domicile at the time of the 
divorce. 
[4] Id. - Foreign Divorce - Res Judieata.-A contention that a 
judgment of separate maintenance obtained by the wife in 
Dlinois, the state in which she was domiciled at the time she 
secured the judgment, after the rendition of an ell: parte 
divorce decree for the husband in Nevada, was unauthorized 
by minois law should have been raised in the Illinois proceed-
ing and is res judicata in a subsequent proceeding in California 
to establish said judgment. 
[6] Id. - Foreign Divorce - Judgment for AlimoD'7 or Separate 
Kaintenance.-As to all accrued instalments not subject to 
modification by the court rendering the original order, an 
order for the payment of money as alimony rendered by a 
court of competent jurisdiction in one state must be recognized 
by all other states under the full faith and credit clause of 
the United States Constitution, and such an order is also 
recognized in California as to future payments. 
[6] Id.-Foreign Divorce-Supplemental Judgment Order.-Hav· 
ing acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the 
parties in a divorce action brought by the husband, an 
Dlinois court retained jurisdiction to modify and enforce 
its support order and therefore had jurisdiction, after the 
husband obtained an ex parte divorce decree in Nevada, to 
enter a supplemental judgment order ft:s:ing the amount of 
accrued arrearages; the husband, however, was entitled to 
notice of the proceedings culmiuating in that order and, if no 
notice was given him, the order is unenforceable. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. ,-4: F. Moroney, Judge. Affirmed in parf 
and reversed in part with directions. 
) 
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Action to establish and enforce a foreign judgment for sepa-
rate maintenance, and to recover the amounts unpaid there-
under. Judgment for defendant affirmed in part and re-
\"ersed in part with directions. 
Brock, Easton, Fleishman & Rykoff and Robert L. Brock for 
~\ppellant. 
Sidney A. Cherniss and Louis Miller for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J .-The parties were husband and wife and 
were domiciled in Illinois. In 1944, the husband, defendant 
herein, brought an action for divorce in an Illinois court. The 
wife, plaintiff herein, answered and cross-complained for sepa-
rate maintenance. Defendant answered the cross-complaint. 
Thereafter, he established his domicile in Nevada and, on 
August 27, 1947, brought an action for divorce in a court 
of that state, disclosing the pendency of the Illinois action 
and giving notice to plaintiff by serving her personally in the 
state of Illinois. (Of, Walker v. Oity of Hutchinson, 352 
U.S. 112 [77 S.Ct. 200, 202-203,1 L.Ed.2d 178].) She did not 
appear. The Illinois court sought unsuccessfully to enjoin 
defendant from prosecuting the Nevada action. On Septem-
ber 30, 1947, the Nevada court entered its judgment granting 
defendant a default divorce and ordering that the parties 
were" ... released from the obligations of the marriage and 
restored to the status of single persons.' '. Soon thereafter 
the divorce action in Illinois came to trial. Defendant did 
not pursue his complaint or defend against the plaintiff's 
cross-complaint .. On December 30, 1947, the Illinois court 
entered judgment for plaintiff on her cross-complaint, making 
permanent its prior temporary order that defendant pay 
plaintiff $18 a week for her support. By a "judgment order" 
entered in the Illinois action on December 12, 1950, the 
Illinois court found defendant in default on the weekly pay-
ments in the sum of $3,078. Defendant remarried shortly 
after entry of the Nevada decree and is now a resident of 
California. According to his own testimony he has made no 
payments to plaintift' since October or November of 1947. 
Plaintiff resides in Illinois and has not remarried. 
-The decree would te~inate plaintiff '8 right to support if she were 
a Nevada domiciliary. (Bummer, v. Bummer" 69 Nev. 83, 85·86, 92·93 
[241 P.2d 1091]; Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 68 [25 P.2d 318J; 
Sweeney v. SweeMY, 42 Nev. 431, 438·439 [119 P. 638].) 
) 
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Plaintiff uJ'onght this action to establish the lllinois Judg· 
ment of Decclllher 30, 1947 and the subsequent .. judgment 
order" of Decemhl'r 12, 1950, as judgments in t.his state and 
to recover the amounts unpaid thereunder. Defendant cross· 
complained to establisb the validity of the Nevada decree 
The trial court entered judgment for defendant. concluding 
that the Nevada decree terminated his obligation to support 
plaintiff and that the minoi!'! judgments are" . invalid and 
unenforceable as against dE'fendant. and are not entitled 
to recognition in this court or in this State." Plaintiff 
appeals. 
Plaintiff contends that the Illinois court had jurisdiction 
to adjudicate her right to support and that the Hlinois judg· 
ment of December 30. 1947. and the nIinois "judgment 
order" of December 12, 1950 are entitled to recognition in this 
state under the ful] faith and credit clausE' of thE' United 
States Constitution. (U.S Const., art. TV. § 1: 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738.) Defendant contends that the Nevada decree ter· 
minated the marriage and plaintiff's right to support and left 
the minoiE; court without a "res" upon which to act and that 
the minois judgment and .. judgment order" were therefore 
entered without jurisdiction and are not entitled to recogni. 
tion in this state. He also contends that even if the 1947 
judgment is a valid adjudication of his obligation to support 
plaintiff. the 1950 "judgment order" is void because he was 
not given notice of the proceedings reSUlting in that order, 
and that recovery under the 1947 judgment for payments that 
became due more than Bve years before Angust 26, 1954, 
the date of the commencement of this action, is barred by the 
five-year limitation on actions on judgments found prior to 
1953 in subdivision 1 of section 336 of the Califoruia Code 
of Civil Procedure.- Plaintiff agrees that if the 1950 "judg· 
ment order" is void, recovery of thepayment!l due prior to 
August 26. 1949. is barred as defendant contends. 
Defendant acknowledges the settled rule that when a wife 
has secured a judgment of separate maintenance in the state 
of her domici1e, her right to support thereunder will survive 
a subsequent valid. ex parte, foreign decree of divorce secured 
by her husband if the law of her domicile so provides. 
(Estin v. Est1.n, 334 U.S. 541 r68 S.Ct. 1213. 92 L.Ed. 1561, 
1 A.TJ.R2rl 14121 . o/-nrfhley v Worthley. 44 Cal.2d 465 f283 . 
-Defendant did not plead seetion 36] ot the California Code ot Civil 
ProcedurE' nor the llIinoie statute ot limitations ap~lieable thereunder. 
(See B~w/1t1d Y. B~1&/171d. 17 Cal.2d 108, 114·117 109 P.2d 701, 18' 
A.L.B. 12641; BI," Y. S"/1GfA, 119 Cal. 526, 527-529 51 P. Maj.) 
Nov. 1957] LEWIS v. LEWIS 
149 C.2d 389; 31'1 P.2d 98'1 J 
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P.2d 19J i Pope v. Pop*" 2 Il1.2d 152 1117 N.E.2d 65J.) He 
contends, however. relying on Ohtrgwin v Oht.rgwln. 26 Oal 
App.2d 506 [79 P.2d 7721, that a wife may not enforce a 
support order obtained by her in the state of her domicilt' 
after the rendition of a valid. ex parte. foreign divorce decret' 
in favor of her husband. (See also De Young v. De Young. 
27 Oal.2d 521 [165 P.2d 4571; Oardinale v. Oardinale. 8 Oal 
2d 762 [68 P.2d 3511; Proper v. Proper, 102 Oal.App.2d 612 
[228 P.2d 62] ; Ooleman v Ooleman. 92 Oal.App.2d 312 {206 
P.2d 1093]; Patterson v. Patterson, 82 Oal.App.2d 838 [187 
P.2d 113] j Oalhoun v. Oalhoun. 70 Oal.App.2d 233 1160 P.2d 
923].} [1] The first answer to this contention is that it 
should have been invoked in the Hlinois proceeding and that 
even if the Nevada decree had been pleaded as a defense in 
that proceeding and the Hlinois court had erroneously failed 
to recognize it. defendant's remedy was by appeal and he 
cannot now attack the Illinois .judgment. (Treinies v. Sun. 
shine Min. 00., 308 U.S 66. 78 f 60 S.Ot. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85] ; 
Morris v. Jones. 329 U.S. 545. 551-552 [67 S.Ot. 451, 91 L.Ed 
488. 168 A.L.R. 656J; see Rest., Judgments § 13.) [a] The 
second answer is that even if defendant could now attack the 
Illinois judgment, the recent decision of the ·United States 
Supreme Oourt in Vanderbt.'lt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 [77 
S.Ct. 1360. 1 L.Ed.2d 1456J, demonstrates that his contention 
is without merit. The husband in the Vanderbilt case secured I 
an ex parte Nevada divorce. Subsequently, the wife brought 
an action against the husband for support in a New York 
court. In affirming an award to the wife, the court stated: 
"In Eslin v. Estin ... this Court decided that a Nevada di· 
vorce court, which had no personal jurisdiction over the wife, 
had no power to terminate a husband's obligation to provide 
her support as required in a pre-existing New York sepa· 
ration decree. The factor which distinguishes the present 
case from Estin is that here the wife's right to support had not 
been reduced to judgment prior to the husband's ex parte 
divorce. In our opinion this difference is not material on the 
question before us. Since the wife was not subject to its juris· 
diction, the Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish 
any right which she had under the law of New York to 
financial support from her husband. It has long been the 
constitutional rule ~at a court cannot adjudicate a personal 
claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person 
of the defendant. Here. the Nevada divorce court was as 
powerless to cut off the wife's support right as it would have 
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been to order the husband to pay alimony if the wife had 
brought the divorce action and he had not been subject to the 
divorce court's juri~diction." (354 U.S. at 418-419 [77 S.Ct. 
at 1362-1363].) The court held "Therefore, the Nevada 
decree, to the extent it purported to a1iect the wife's right 
to support, was void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
did not obligate New York to give it recognition." (354 U.S. 
at 419 [77 S.Ct. at 1363]; see also concurring opinion in 
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 575 [76 S.Ct. 629. 
100 L.Ed. 705}.) 
In this case, therefore, the Illinois" 'court was not 
obliged to recognize that part of the Nevada judgment pur-
porting to terminate plainti1i's right to support under Illinois 
law, nor are we. Chirgwin v. Chirgwin, supra, 26 CaI.App.2d 
506, is inconsistent with the Vanderbilt case and is therefore 
disapproved. The other California cases referred to above in 
connection with defendant's contention that his obligation to 
support plainti1i was terminated by the Nevada decree are 
not in point. [3] The e1iect on a wife's right to support 
of a foreign, ex parte divorce secured by her husband is de-
termined by reference to the law of the state of the wife's 
domicile at the time of the divorce, in this case the law of 
Illinois. (See Estin v. Estin, supra, 334 U.S; at 544, 547; 
Buttrm v. Lei-b, 342 U.S. 402, 406 [72 S.Ct. 398, 96 L.Ed. 448] ; 
Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, 280-281 [65 S.Ct. 
1118,89 L.Ed. 1608, 157 A.L.R. 1396] ; Worthley v. Worthley, 
supra, 44 Cal.2d at 468; Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Ca1.2d 108, 
111, 114 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264]; Vanderbilt v. 
Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342 [135 N.E.2d 553, 557-558} ; Morris, 
Div4sible Divorce, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1287, 1302. 
Illinois was the state of domicile of both defendant and 
plaintiff when the Illinois action was brought and was the 
state of plainti1i's domicile when the judgment was entered. 
[4] Defendant contends that the judgment was unauthorized 
by Illinois law, citing Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158, 165 
[39 N.E. 595} and two Illinois statutes. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 
1953, ch. 40, par. 19 [Jones Ann.Stat. 109.186J; Ill.Rev.Stat. 
1953; ch. 68, par. 22 [Jones Ann.Stat. 109.189}.) This COJl~ 
tention should have been raised in the Illinois proceeding and 
is. res judicata. Moreover, the Illinois law is now settled con-
traryto defendant's contention. Speaking of the Knowlton 
case, the Supreme OOurt of Illinois said in Pope v. Pope, 2 Ill~ 
2d 152, 156 [117'N.E.2d 65] : "It appears. ' .. that the de-
cision was not based on Illinois law but on a supposed require. 
) 
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ment of the full faith and credit clause which may no longer 
exist. See Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 [33 S.Ct. 
129, 57 L.Ed. 347J; Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 [68 
S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561, 1 A.L.R.2d 14121, note 4." It IS 
now definitely established that the supposed full faith and 
credit requirement on which Knowlton was based does not 
exist. (Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra, 354 U.S. 416 [77 S.Ct. 
1360J.) Any doubt that under the law of Illinois tbe right 
to support survives a foreign ex parte divorce was laid at rest 
by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the Pope case: c~A decree 
of divorce enables tbe parties to contract a new marriage; 
tbat it does not necessarily relieve them of all tb:! obligations 
of the old is witnessed by the award of alimony upon, or even 
after divorce." (2 Il1.2d at 157.) "Occasional suggestions 
in our opinions that divorce terminates the right to support or 
kindred property rights [citations] must be considered as 
referring only to those situations where the wife has par-
ticipated in the proceedings, or where a contract between 
the parties was construed to require this result." (2 Ill.2d 
at 158.) 
[5] The question next to be considered is whether the 
Illinois judgment of December 30, 1947, is entitled to recogni-
tion in California. Payments past due under an TIlinois sep-
arate maintenance. decree are not subject to modification in 
TIlinois. (Stewart v. Stewart, 1 Ill.App.2d 283, 286 [117 
N.E.2d 579] and cases there cited.) As to all accrued in-
stalments not subject to modification by tbe court rendering 
the original order, an order for tbe payment of money as 
alimony rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in one 
state must be recognized by all other states under the full 
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. 
(Biewend v. Biewencl, supra, 17 Ca1.2d at 110-111 and cases 
cited.) Such an order is also recognized in California as to 
future payments. (Biewend v. Biewend, supra, 17 Ca1.2d at 
113; Worthley v. Worthley, supra, 44 Ca1.2d at 474.) 
[6] The final question concerns the effect to be given the 
supplemental judgment order of the Illinois court of Decem-
ber 12, 1950. Having acquired jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter and of the parties in the divorce action brought by defend-
ant, the Illinois court retained jurisdiction to modify and 
enforce its support oJ'{ler. (Karr v. Rust,217 Ill.App. 555, 561; 
Adam v. Saenger/803 U.S. 59, 67-68 [58 S.Ct. 454, 82 L:Ed. 
649] ; Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 [33 S.Ct. 
550, 57 L.Ed. 867]; Rest., Conflict of Laws, §§ 76, 105.) It 
• 
) 
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therefore had Juri.c;diction to enter the supplempntal .. jlld~ 
ment order" of Del'l'mber 12. 1950. fixing the amount of a(' 
crued arrearages Nevertheless. defendant w~ entitled tit 
notice of the proceedIngs cuhniuatinfl in that order. and if no 
notice was given him. the order is unenforceable (GrifJi:" v 
Grit/in.327 U.S 220.228 [66 S.Ct. 556. gO L.Ed 6351. Haut 
Inan v KaUfman. 279 Ul.App I, 4: Cltmmer v Cllmmer. 28:~ 
m.App. 220. 235; W orthte1l v. Worthley. supra. 44 Ca1.2d 465. 
469, 471.) Defendant testified and the trial court found that 
with respect to the 1950 proceedings defendant was not served 
with summons or other process and did not appear personally 
or by counsel. There was no evidence and no finding as to 
whether service was made upon the attorney who represented 
defendant in the original action. (See Bevnolds v. Reynolds. 
21 Oa1.2d 580. 583 [134 P.2d 251).) Under [llinois law, bow· 
ever, such service would apparently not suffice as notice to 
defendant. (Cummer v. Cummer, supra, 283 ru.App.at 
235-237.) Nevertheless, it is obvious that tbe finding made 
by the trial court is not a finding that defendant bad no 
notice. The finding is simply tbat he was not served and that 
he did not appear. [n view of the court's continuing juris· 
diction over defendant in matters relating to modification 
an:d enforcement of the support order, the .question is not 
whether he was served or appeared but whether be bad notice. 
Service in a technical sense is not required.. Actual notice 
is sufficient. (See Griffin v. Griffin, supra, 327 U.S. at 228; 
Oummer v. Oummer, supra, 283 Ill.App. at 237; see MuUane 
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 et seq. [70 
S.Ot. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865] ; Walker v. City of Hutchw01&, supra, 
77 S.Ct. at 202.) There is no evidence from which we can 
determine whether or not defendant had notice. This fact 
can be ascertained on retrial. 
If defendant had no notice of the 1950 proceedings, the 
., judgment order" of December 12, 1950, is unenforceable, 
and plaintiff's rights must be determined und~r the judgment 
of December 12, 1947. Recovery for payments due there· 
under prior to August 26. 1949. is barred by the five-year 
statute of limitations found prior to 1953 in subdivision 1 of 
section 336 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Chambers 
v. Gallagher, 177 Cal. 704, 708·709 [171 P. 931].) If de· 
fendant had notice of the 1950 proceedings, the co judgment 
order" of DecemJler 12, 1950, is a valid judgment entitled 
to recognition rider the full faith and credit clause of the 
United States Constitution, and the applicable statute Of 
/:) 
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limitations is the lO-year statute found in section 337.5 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1953. (See Mudd v 
McColgan. 30 Cal.2d 463. 468 [183 P.2d 10].) 
The judgment is affirmed insofar as it determines that 
the Nevada decree terminated the marital status of the parnell 
and is reversed in aU other respects for furt~er proceedings 
in accordance with the views expressed herein. 
Gibson. C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence . 
• J., and McComb J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
17. 1957. and the judgment was modified to read as printed 
above. 
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